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Expanding the Role of Trade Preference 
Programs 
Monica Patel∗ 
“[N]ations that trade with each other do not go to war.”1 A 
developed country that assists developing countries with inter-
national trade and economic growth creates benefits for both 
sides. However, many developing countries face difficulty when 
it comes to economic growth. The Generalized System of Prefer-
ences (GSP) program’s goal is to help developing countries’ 
economies grow by providing “temporary preferential advan-
tages”2 in which developed countries lower the custom duties 
on goods imported from qualified developing countries.3 Given 
all of the history and text regarding the program,4 one would 
think it would get adequate attention and resources. On the 
contrary, the U.S. GSP program only has, on average, two em-
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 1. Rafael Leal-Arcas, The European Union and New Leading Powers: 
Towards Partnership in Strategic Trade Policy Areas, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 
345, 346 (2009) (“Trade creates economic ties and generates more prosperity; 
thus it contributes to peace and security, since nations that trade with each 
other do not go to war.”). 
 2. Generalized System of Preferences Renewal Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 
98-573, § 501(b), 98 Stat. 3018, 3018. 
 3. See SEC’Y-GEN., ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT, THE GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES: REVIEW OF THE 
FIRST DECADE 9 (1982) (“The solution proposed was the creation of a system of 
non-reciprocal preferences, under which the developed countries would lower the 
custom duties they assessed on goods imported from developing countries.”); In-
formation on Countries Eligible for GSP, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/ATT%20(A)%20-%20090417%20GSP_BDC 
.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2011) (listing the eligible countries). 
 4. See infra Part I.A (discussing the Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) rule, 
which initially precluded the possibility of giving trade benefits to developing 
countries until the global community gradually accepted the idea). 
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ployees.5 With such lofty and demanding responsibilities, the 
two GSP employees leave late on a daily basis due to the im-
mense workload.6 At times, their efforts push countries, like 
Afghanistan, to export just one more product, such as dried 
apricots.7 Yet GSP celebrates seemingly small results because 
it means one more exporter will utilize the program’s duty-free 
treatment.8 Though based on great intentions, GSP’s attempt 
to increase exports from developing countries barely produces 
any significant increase in trade or, more importantly, econom-
ic growth for developing countries and the global economy.9  
In the late 1960s, many members of the World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO) first expressed the need for trade preference 
programs.10 These members realized that more needed to be 
done to industrialize developing countries,11 typically low- and 
middle-income countries.12 Trade preference programs lower 
 
 5. Telephone Interview with Marideth Sandler, Exec. Dir., GSP Pro-
gram, Office of U.S. Trade Representative (Dec. 28, 2009). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Kevin Moss, Note, The Consequences of the WTO Appellate Body Deci-
sion in EC—Tariff Preferences for the African Growth Opportunity Act and 
Sub-Saharan Africa, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 665, 671 (2006) (“[T]he over-
all impact of the last thirty years of preferential treatment for developing 
countries has been meager. Developing countries have increased their share of 
world merchandise trade from twenty percent in 1973 to only twenty-eight 
percent twenty-five years later.”). 
 10. See Gregory Shaffer & Yvonne Apea, Institutional Choice in the GSP 
Case: Who Decides the Conditions for Trade Preferences?, 39 J. WORLD TRADE 
977, 979 (2005). 
 11. See Cosmas Milton Obote Ochieng, The EU–ACP Economic Partner-
ship Agreements and the ‘Development Question’: Constraints and Opportuni-
ties Posed by Article XXIV and Special and Differential Treatment Provisions 
of the WTO, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 363, 374–75 (2007) (stating that General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) members recognized that different 
strategies were necessary for trade rules based on a country’s level of devel-
opment); see also Marley S. Weiss, International Labor and Employment Law: 
From Periphery to Core, 25 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 487, 499 (2010) (suggest-
ing that trade preference programs are important since they have helped en-
courage better workers’ rights in developing countries). 
 12. See How We Classify Countries, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank 
.org/about/country-classifications (last visited Mar. 4, 2011); see also Who Are 
the Developing Countries in the WTO?, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/ 
english/tratop_e/devel_e/d1who_e.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2011). See generally 
JONATHAN E. SANFORD & ANJULA SANDHU, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: 
DEFINITIONS, CONCEPTS AND COMPARISONS, at vii (2003) (explaining that a 
country may be designated “developing” on the basis of per capita income, eco-
nomic and social structure, social conditions, or the prevailing level of econom-
ic and political freedom). 
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trade barriers and open opportunities in consumer-driven mar-
kets which, in turn, increases trade and economic growth.13 
Thus, the programs reduce the cost of exporting goods for par-
ticipating developing countries by providing duty-free treat-
ment that allows exporters in the developing countries to more 
easily compete in developed countries’ markets.14 Because ex-
isting trade principles in the WTO prohibit differential treat-
ment, the WTO drafted the Enabling Clause in the WTO 
Agreement to allow developed countries to establish trade pref-
erence programs.15 Unfortunately, the ensuing programs simp-
ly have not done enough to aid developing countries, and thus 
achieve the desired increase in trade for all countries.16 Though 
preference programs produce some results,17 they barely pro-
vide meaningful achievement for developing countries18 be-
cause the programs are limited in scope.19 The programs typi-
cally offer duty-free treatment for products that are not feasibly 
 
 13. See TRACY MURRAY, TRADE PREFERENCES FOR DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 147 (1977) (finding that developing countries have “high produc-
tion costs, . . . less frequent transportation services . . . and less effective mar-
keting and distribution channels”); SEC’Y-GEN., supra note 3, at 9 (stating that 
“preferential tariff rates in the markets of developed countries could provide 
impetus for the industrial development of the Third World,” allowing them to 
“overcome difficulties . . . arising from high initial costs”). 
 14. See MURRAY, supra note 13, at 147. 
 15. See Lorand Bartels, The WTO Enabling Clause and Positive Condition-
ality in the European Community’s GSP Program, 6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 507, 
509 (2003). 
 16. Compare Moss, supra note 9, at 671 (explaining that developing coun-
tries’ share of world trade has increased only slightly and concluding that “the 
overall impact of the last thirty years has been meager”), with SEC’Y-GEN., su-
pra note 3, at 10 (noting that the “objectives of the system would be: (a) to in-
crease developing countries’ export earnings; (b) to promote their industriali-
sation; and (c) to accelerate their rates of economic growth”). 
 17. See SEC’Y-GEN., supra note 3, at 12 (“From 1976 to 1980 . . . . [t]he 
positive influence of the GSP on the evolution of imports from developing 
countries can be seen from the fact that imports benefiting from GSP treat-
ment grew over the period at an average rate of nearly 27 per cent per year.”). 
 18. See MURRAY, supra note 13, at 149 (“G.S.P. benefits represent only 1 
per cent of total developing-country exports to the preference-giving coun-
tries.”); Moss, supra note 9, at 671 (stating that the impact of preferential 
treatment for developing countries is weak). 
 19. See Moss, supra note 9, at 671–72 (“The GSP has fallen short of expec-
tations largely because benefit-granting countries have failed to include mean-
ingful preferential treatment in the areas of production most important to the 
economic development of beneficiary countries, namely textiles, apparel, and 
agriculture.”). 
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profitable without taking into consideration the large initial 
costs of export preparation.20 
This Note argues that the existing trade preference pro-
grams do not effectively help developing countries increase 
their share in trade or economic growth. Part I sets forth the 
WTO’s recognition of the need for trade preference programs, 
the resulting laws, and the potential flaws in the current strat-
egies. Part II argues that mismatched product coverage, the 
short-term nature and unreliability of the programs, and expor-
tation obstacles that are unique to developing countries hinder 
the effectiveness of trade preference programs. Part III sug-
gests that the United States modify its trade preference pro-
grams to maximize efficiency by more actively seeking out and 
easing the export process for qualified developing countries. 
Based on participant observation and an interview with the 
GSP Program Executive Director, this Note proposes that the 
success of the GSP program depends on the interrelationship 
between the GSP office and the developing country. Only when 
the GSP office assumes responsibility as an agent for the devel-
oping country will this program truly aid these countries and, 
in turn, the global economy. 
I.  THE EFFECT OF TRADE PREFERENCE PROGRAMS ON 
EXISTING LAW AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES   
This Part examines the development of and history behind 
trade preference programs. It looks both at the impetus behind 
the programs’ formation and whether current programs effec-
tively accomplish their stated goals. An examination of the his-
tory behind trade preference programs reveals that these pro-
grams were formulated to correct economic imbalances that 
hinder the economic success of developing countries. 
A. JUSTIFYING TRADE PREFERENCE PROGRAMS WITHIN 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND PRINCIPLES 
The WTO is an organization that produces rules and 
agreements that govern the trading relationship of its members 
(which consists of 153 countries and amounts to about ninety-
seven percent of international trade).21 Accordingly, a country 
 
 20. See infra Parts II.A, II.C. 
 21. Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/ 
english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2011); The 
World Trade Organization in Brief, WORLD TRADE ORG. (2009), http://www.wto 
.org/english/res_e/doload_e/inbr_e.pdf. 
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cannot establish a program that grants preferential treatment 
to a select few without conflicting with international trade law 
and the WTO Agreement.22 Nonetheless, the idea behind trade 
preference programs eventually gained sufficient support in the 
WTO for inclusion within the WTO Agreement.23 
A fundamental WTO principle is that the world economy 
benefits most when WTO members trade freely with each other 
based on supply and demand, rather than on noneconomic in-
terests.24 Countries should prioritize market efficiency over 
economic protectionism through trade barriers.25 In 1947, the 
WTO Agreement legalized this principle under the Most-
Favoured Nation (MFN) rule, which requires a WTO member 
to offer, immediately and unconditionally, any advantage or 
privilege regarding custom duties for imports and exports given 
to the like product for all other contracting parties.26 In other 
words, the MFN rule prohibits WTO members from providing 
benefits solely to developing countries.27  
Gradually, however, the idea of granting Special and Dif-
ferential Treatment (S&DT)28 to developing countries, based on 
 
 22. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. I, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 
Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. 
 23. See infra notes 35, 37 and accompanying text. 
 24. See Gillian Moon, Trade and Equality: A Relationship to Discover, 12 
J. INT’L ECON. L. 617, 620 (2009) (“If products are to flow freely between coun-
tries, which is necessary if the benefits of the efficiency model are to be real-
ized, demand for them must be based on price and quality, while country of 
origin must, by and large, be irrelevant.”). 
 25. Id. at 619 (arguing that the WTO prohibits unequal treatment be-
cause individual governments tend to favor their own industries). 
 26. GATT, supra note 22, art. I (stating that the MFN rule, “[w]ith respect 
to customs duties” related to imports and exports, is that “any advantage, fa-
vour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product 
originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately 
and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the terri-
tories of all other contracting parties”); see also Moon, supra note 24, at 619–
20 (noting that products of WTO-member countries get most favorable treat-
ment from member countries and that “[i]f a WTO member country makes a 
distinction, such as setting a lower tariff for a product from one country, the 
like product of other WTO-member countries will immediately and uncondi-
tionally become entitled to that lower tariff ”). 
 27. See Bartels, supra note 15, at 514 (“[T]rade concessions can have the 
effect of undermining the WTO rights of other Members.”). 
 28. See Moon, supra note 24, at 618 (stating that despite MFN, “WTO law 
includes roughly 150 provisions known as Special and Differential Treatment 
(S&DT), which purposively treat members unequally by granting developing 
countries’ products especially favorable treatment in trade”). 
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exceptional circumstances,29 formed from the idea that trade is 
not equal between nations who are at different levels of indus-
trialization.30 The WTO preamble states that members should 
assist developing countries to “secure a share in the growth of 
international trade commensurate with the needs of their eco-
nomic development.”31 In 1971, the WTO granted a waiver, 
based on the exceptional circumstances standard in Article IX 
of the WTO Agreement,32 to create a trade preference pro-
gram.33 Though the WTO does not define “exceptional circum-
stances,” it found an “exceptional situation” because the An-
dean nations needed “to expand their trade and economics” and 
granted the United States a waiver for the Andean Trade Pref-
erences Act (ATPA).34 Thus, the WTO grants waivers to estab-
 
 29. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 
art. IX, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement]. 
 30. See Ochieng, supra note 11, at 374 (stating that developing countries 
emphasized the “different stages of development” to pave the way for the con-
cept of S&DT and the creation of the Enabling Clause); see also Patricia Mi-
chelle Lenaghan, Trade Negotiations or Trade Capitulations: An African Expe-
rience, 17 LA RAZA L.J. 117, 117 (2006) (arguing that MFN did “not take into 
account existing inequality in economic structures as well as levels of devel-
opment between developed and developing (less developed) countries” and that 
trade preferences were expected to overcome these disadvantages); Omar T. 
Mohammedi, International Trade and Investment in Algeria: An Overview, 18 
MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 375, 395 (2010) (stating that developing countries be-
lieved “their markets were too small to support the development of manufac-
turing industries”); John I. Huhs, Note, Trade Preferences for Developing 
Countries: Options for Ordering International Economic and Political Rela-
tions, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1150, 1164 (1968) (calling GATT a “rich man’s club” 
(quoting S. DELL, TRADE BLOCS AND COMMON MARKETS 244 n.4 (1963))). 
 31. PETER GALLAGHER, GUIDE TO THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
22 (2000); see also GATT, supra note 22, pmbl. (“Being desirous of contributing 
to these objectives by entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous ar-
rangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers 
to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international 
commerce . . . .”). 
 32. See Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 29, art. IX; see also Daniel Mar-
inberg, Note, GATT/WTO Waivers: “Exceptional Circumstances” as Applied to 
the Lomé Waiver, 19 B.U. INT’L L.J. 129, 130 (2001) (“Article IX of the WTO 
Agreement provide[s] for a waiver of the obligations . . . in cases of exceptional 
circumstances.”). 
 33. Generalized System of Preferences, L/3545 (June 25, 1971), GATT 
B.I.S.D. (18th Supp.) at 24 (1972); see also Bartels, supra note 15, at 511 (stat-
ing that GSP needs a waiver “to enable developed countries to grant prefer-
ences to developing countries without also granting the same preferences” to 
all other member countries); Moss, supra note 9, at 669 (commenting that in 
1971 the WTO waived MFN obligations for ten years). 
 34. Marinberg, supra note 32, at 150–51. Some commentators suggest 
that the WTO will not grant a waiver to remedy economic injury alone or to 
achieve a situation that could be accomplished though other methods. Id. at 
  
1496 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [95:1490 
 
lish trade preference programs that bypass the MFN rule as 
one way to respond to the need for S&DT.35 
Another method became available when, in the Tokyo 
Round of trade negotiations in 1979, the WTO members created 
the Enabling Clause,36 which allows WTO members to provide 
S&DT through trade preference programs.37 Therefore, devel-
oped countries may grant preferences without violating the 
MFN rule and without the need for a waiver.38 The Enabling 
Clause, as a voluntary regime, has subsequently been con-
strued as providing for generalized, nonreciprocal, and nondi-
scriminatory preferences.39 
 
133 (“If the request did not appear to contain truly urgent policy objectives or 
sought objectives that could have been achieved through other methods consis-
tent with the GATT obligations, even though posing increased difficulties to 
the requesting party, the waiver was not likely to be granted.”); id. at 143 
(classifying exceptional circumstances into eight factors: hardship, harm that 
is not only economic, single or very limited group of affected nations, prolonged 
arrangement or restrictions, serious injury to an entire domestic industry, ab-
sence of alternatives, possibility of eliminating GATT-inconsistent measures, 
and lack of precedent). Note that most current waivers deal with attempts to 
conform with the Harmonized System, thus limiting any precedential compar-
ison. See id. at 146. 
 35. See Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 29, art. IX. 
 36. See Moss, supra note 9, at 670.  
 37. Differential and More Favourable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller 
Participation of Developing Countries, L/4903 (Nov. 28, 1979), GATT B.I.S.D. 
(26th Supp.) at 203 (1980) [hereinafter Enabling Clause], available at http:// 
www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/tokyo_enabling_e.pdf (“[C]ontracting par-
ties may accord differential and more favourable treatment to developing 
countries, without according such treatment to other contracting parties 
. . . [where] [p]referential tariff treatment [is] accorded by developed contract-
ing parties to products originating in developing countries in accordance with 
the Generalized System of Preferences . . . .”); see also Bartels, supra note 15, 
at 513 (noting that the Enabling Clause has been construed to allow developed 
countries to give differential treatment on a voluntary basis); Moss, supra note 
9, at 670 (“The Enabling Clause also goes beyond the limits of the 1971 Waiver 
Decision, permitting preferential treatment for developing countries . . . .”). 
 38. See also Huhs, supra note 30, at 1162 (finding additional support that 
the Enabling Clause was legal via Article XXIV’s grant of permission for the 
creation of custom unions and free trade agreements, which shows that some-
times increasing trade with specific countries improves the overall welfare 
without hurting other WTO members). 
 39. See Bartels, supra note 15, at 522 (explaining that the GSP scheme is 
“an autonomous regime granted on a non-reciprocal, generalized and non-
discriminatory basis” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Moss, supra 
note 9, at 670 (explaining the principle of graduation where “developing coun-
tries accept greater obligations under the GATT as their economic situations 
improve and are graduated from a country’s GSP regime once they reach a 
specified level of economic development”). 
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Countries’ understanding of the Enabling Clause’s provi-
sions, however, remains incomplete. The meaning of “general-
ized,” for instance, swings between two extremes: a broad scope 
of product coverage or a narrow application to countries.40 In 
contrast, the WTO has interpreted “non-reciprocal” more con-
cretely, providing that developed countries should not expect 
mutual benefits for their trade preferences.41 Moreover, the 
WTO has understood “non-discriminatory” to mean that devel-
oped countries should not discriminate between the developing 
countries when granting preferences.42 In 2002, India chal-
lenged the European Communities’ (EC) preferential programs 
by claiming that the EC violated the nondiscriminatory re-
quirement and the MFN rule.43 The WTO Appellate Body, how-
ever, found that the least-developed countries (LDCs) could be 
differentiated based on “development, financial or trade 
need[s].”44 These “needs” must meet three criteria: they must 
be objective, they must be effectively addressed through trade 
preferences, and the treatment must be sufficiently connected 
to the need.45 As a result of the Enabling Clause, developed 
countries have another route through which they may provide 
duty-free treatment on products to help developing countries 
enter their markets.46 
Thus, due to the WTO consensus in response to developing 
countries and the MFN rule, WTO member countries no longer 
violate the MFN rule if they provide trade preferences to devel-
oping countries, provided they acquire the WTO waiver or ad-
here to the Enabling Clause.47  
 
 40. See Shaffer & Apea, supra note 10, at 994. 
 41. See Bartels, supra note 15, at 528. 
 42. Id. at 524. 
 43. See Lorand Bartels, The WTO Legality of the EU’s GSP+ Arrangement, 
10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 869, 873 (2007); Moss, supra note 9, at 665. 
 44. Bartels, supra note 43, at 873 (footnote omitted); see also Moss, supra 
note 9, at 666 (stating that the WTO held that “the Enabling Clause requires 
that identical tariff preferences under GSP schemes be provided to all develop-
ing countries without differentiation except in the cases of least-developed 
countries (LDCs)” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 45. See Bartels, supra note 43, at 873. For countries not considered to be 
LDCs, the WTO Appellate Body decision in response to India’s 2002 challenge 
only resulted in minor modifications for trade programs. See Moss, supra note 
9, at 667. 
 46. See Enabling Clause, supra note 37, at 203. 
 47. See id.; Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 29, art. IX. 
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B. ENACTMENT AND STATUS OF TRADE PREFERENCE PROGRAMS 
After the principle of granting trade preferences no longer 
conflicted with existing trade law, many developed countries 
formed programs to help industrialize developing countries.48 
The United States, for example, created the GSP program that 
provides duty-free treatment for about 4800 products from 131 
countries.49 The program allows qualified countries to send 
their GSP-eligible products to the developed country without 
paying the customary duty.50  
All countries model their trade preference programs on ei-
ther positive or negative conditionality, though negative model-
ing is more predominant than positive.51 The United States, for 
instance, engages in negative conditionality, which takes pref-
erences away if a developing country engages in undesirable 
behavior, such as human rights violations.52 Many European 
nations engage in positive conditionality, such as the GSP Plus 
program, where certain products get an additional reduction in 
duty rates if an LDC complies with certain standards.53 The 
GSP Plus program requires that the country ratify and imple-
ment sixteen human rights conventions and at least seven of 
eleven good governance conventions.54 The country also must 
be a vulnerable country based on poverty, nondiversification of 
exports, and its share of EU GSP-covered imports.55 
 
 48. See, e.g., Authority to Extend Preferences, 19 U.S.C. § 2461 (2006); see 
also Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, id. §§ 2701–2707; Andean Trade 
Preferences Act, id. §§ 3201–3206; African Growth and Opportunity Act, id. 
§§ 3701–3741; Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), EUR. COMMISSION, http:// 
ec.europa.eu/trade/wider-agenda/development/generalised-system-of-preferences/ 
(last visited Mar. 4, 2011). 
 49. See Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), OFF. U.S. TRADE  
REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-topics/trade-development/preference 
-programs/generalized-system-preference-gsp (last visited Mar. 4, 2011).  
 50. See U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) Guidebook, OFF. U.S. 
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Jan. 2010), http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/1578.  
 51. See Bartels, supra note 15, at 508 n.5. 
 52. See id. at 508; Telephone Interview with Marideth Sandler, supra note 5. 
 53. See Council Regulation (EC) 732/2008, arts. 8–9, 2008 O.J. (L 211/1), 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008: 
211:0001:0039:EN:PDF (providing a list of criteria); Bartels, supra note 15, at 
510 (noting that only Moldova received special preferences through labor rights).  
 54. See Bartels, supra note 43, at 871 (stating that the country must be 
vulnerable, and ratify and implement conventions on human and labor rights, 
environmental protection, and governance). 
 55. See id. at 871; see also id. at 880 (“One situation in which preferential 
treatment would clearly not be permitted is when a beneficiary country does 
not, in fact, have the need at issue.”); EUR. COMMISSION, supra note 48. 
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Productivity assessments of trade preference programs are 
conflicting. On the one hand, global GSP programs noticeably 
increased the number of exports from developing countries be-
tween 1976 and 1980, as GSP-related imports reportedly grew 
by twenty-seven percent each year.56 Further, after GSP was 
instituted, developing countries increased their share in the 
world merchandise trade from twenty percent in 1973 to twen-
ty-eight percent in 1998.57 On the other hand, in 1982, exports 
through GSP were only one percent of total developing country 
exports.58 Many argue, therefore, that trade preferences have 
done little to accomplish the stated goal in an efficient man-
ner.59 The United States, however, considers its trade prefer-
ence program based on the African Growth and Opportunity 
Act (AGOA) to be its most successful trade preference program 
because it has aided economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa.60 
Thus, while many programs have lackluster results, AGOA, at 
the least, is considered a success. 
Commentators offer no shortage of explanations as to why 
trade preference programs only marginally help developing 
countries grow. One reason is that reductions in MFN tariff 
rates reduce the small margin of comparative advantage that 
GSP duty-free treatment is meant to provide.61 Also, short-term 
 
 56. See SEC’Y-GEN., supra note 3, at 12.  
 57. See Moss, supra note 9, at 671. 
 58. See SEC’Y-GEN., supra note 3, at 92 tbl.IV. 
 59. See Moon, supra note 24, at 619 (opining on the “relative failure of 
[special and differential treatment]”); Moss, supra note 9, at 670 (“[T]hey have 
done little to accelerate the economic growth rates of most developing coun-
tries.”). But see Ochieng, supra note 11, at 378–79 (arguing that it “would be 
erroneous to claim that all preferential schemes have failed” based on the 
graduation of South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, and Hong Kong from United 
States and European Union GSP programs and that “[e]ven among the ACP 
group, countries such as Mauritius and Botswana made significant gains”). 
 60. See Preference Programs, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http:// 
www.ustr.gov/trade-topics/trade-development/preference-programs (last visited 
Mar. 4, 2011) (“Another highly successful program is the African Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA), which was enacted in 2000 and also allows duty-free 
entry of goods from 40 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.”); see also Moss, supra 
note 9, at 668 (“AGOA is a unique and meaningful vehicle for economic growth 
in [sub-Saharan Africa].”). AGOA beneficiaries must meet specific require-
ments such as complying with intellectual property rights and engaging in lib-
eral economies. See Lenaghan, supra note 30, at 123. 
 61. See GALLAGHER, supra note 31, at 15; George A. Bermann & Petros C. 
Mavroidis, Developing Countries in the WTO System, in WTO LAW AND 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1, 1 (George A. Bermann & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 
2007) (suggesting that preference erosions weakened the effectiveness of trade 
preference programs); see also Harry G. Johnson, Trade Preferences for Manu-
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annual renewals and waivers62 and the disputed legality of 
trade preferences creates unreliability since developing coun-
tries cannot indefinitely count on utilizing the benefits of trade 
preference programs.63 Another criticism is that developed 
countries limit or revoke their preferences based on political 
pressures.64 In response to this problem, some developing coun-
tries advocate that the Enabling Clause should be mandatory 
to prevent political abuse.65 A further alleged problem is that 
the mismatched product coverage limits the potential for effec-
tive benefits.66 While some claim that the AGOA program is 
more successful because it offers more product coverage (in cer-
tain apparel articles) than the regular GSP,67 approximately 
twenty-seven percent of developing countries’ GDP and fifty 
percent of their employment derives from agricultural prod-
ucts,68 which the programs typically exclude.69 Additionally, 
high production costs, poor and unreliable infrastructure, and 
less effective marketing hinders manufacturers in developing 
 
factured Goods, in ECONOMIC POLICIES TOWARD LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
(1967), reprinted in TRADE PREFERENCES AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 33, 69 (Bernard Hoekman & Çağlar Özden eds., 2006).  
 62. See Pablo M. Bentes et al., International Trade, 44 INT’L LAW. 93, 110 
(2010) (stating that ATPA and U.S. GSP were extended through December 31, 
2010, “just as they were about to expire” (citing Act to Extend the Generalized 
System of Preferences and the Andean Trade Preference Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
124, § 2, 123 Stat. 3484, 3484 (2009))); Marinberg, supra note 32, at 134 (ar-
guing that the indefinite nature of waivers “indirectly limits each waiver[’s]” 
effectiveness); Moss, supra note 9, at 672.  
 63. See Olufemi Amao, Trade Sanctions, Human Rights and Multination-
al Corporations: The EU-ACP Context, 32 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 
379, 396–97 (2009) (citing the possibility of revocation of trade benefits for 
human rights violations). 
 64. See SEC’Y-GEN., supra note 3, at 11 (stating that there are political 
pressures against giving benefits); Moon, supra note 24, at 633 (“The USA, for 
example, has used its GSP scheme as ‘a tool to penalize and pressure . . . those 
developing countries whose domestic, trade or international policies conflict 
with the policies or interests of the USA.’” (footnote omitted)).  
 65. See Moon, supra note 24, at 635 (“[T]oo few of the provisions impose 
binding obligations on the industrialized countries, with the result that the 
assistance described generally does not eventuate.”). 
 66. See Robert Z. Lawrence, Futures for the World Trading System and 
Their Implications for Developing Countries, in TRADE AND GROWTH 43, 57 
(Manuel R. Agosin & Diana Tussie eds., 1993) (noting that the Lomé Conven-
tion and Caribbean Basin Initiative limited product scope); Moss, supra note 
9, at 671–72 (arguing that preference programs fail to give meaningful bene-
fits in important production areas). 
 67. See Moss, supra note 9, at 676–77. 
 68. See id. at 673. 
 69. See Ochieng, supra note 11, at 381. 
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countries.70 Lastly, eligibility requirements to qualify for spe-
cial preferences, such as complying with rules of origin and 
phytosanitary standards,71 may pose unsurpassable barriers.72 
In short, there are numerous identified problems with trade 
preference programs. 
Though trade preference programs occasionally produce 
results, the overall consensus is that they do not accomplish 
enough.73 Amidst the many problems that plague these pro-
grams, the key issues seem to be mismatched product coverage, 
the unreliability of the programs’ existence, and the developed 
countries’ unawareness of the barriers facing developing coun-
tries that want to use the trade preference programs.74  
II.  A CLOSER LOOK: SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS WITH 
CURRENT TRADE PREFERENCE PROGRAMS   
The ineffectiveness of trade preference programs signifies 
the existence of a problem with the current approach to provid-
ing trade preferences. While the programs rest on solid concep-
tual foundations, many issues impede their successful imple-
mentation. A closer analysis of the programs reveals potential 
areas for improvement. If countries acknowledge and remedy 
these problems, the programs would likely maximize aid for 
developing countries, increase international trade, and, in ef-
fect, foster global economic growth. 
 
 70. See MURRAY, supra note 13, at 147; Ochieng, supra note 11, at 381 
(finding that product coverage “typically excludes ‘import-sensitive’ and ‘com-
petitive-need’ products from beneficiary countries”). 
 71. See Anastasios Tomazos, The GSP Fallacy: A Critique of the Appellate 
Body’s Ruling in the GSP Case on Legal, Economic, and Political/Systemic 
Grounds, in WTO LAW AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 61, at 306, 
318; see also Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Apr. 15, 1994), http://www.wto.org/english/ 
docs_e/legal_e/15-sps.pdf (WTO agreement stating that Sanitary and Phytosan-
itary are standards related to human, animal, plant life, or health). 
 72. See Ochieng, supra note 11, at 381 (finding that eligibility criteria can 
be costly and possibly infringe on the nonreciprocity element of the Enabling 
Clause). 
 73. See Mohammedi, supra note 30, at 396 (stating that Algeria and many 
other countries in the Middle East and North Africa fail to take advantage of 
the program despite the fact that they import GSP-eligible products to coun-
tries other than the United States); Moss, supra note 9, at 671.  
 74. See MURRAY, supra note 13, at 147; Moss, supra note 9, at 676–77 
(listing barriers). 
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A. THE ELIGIBLE PRODUCTS LIST IS INSUFFICIENT 
A significant problem with trade preference programs is 
that the scope of product coverage conflicts with market-based 
considerations.75 
Participating developed countries provide duty-free treat-
ment to only a limited amount of specific products, irrespective 
of the market.76 Those products are rarely the most beneficial 
or useful for the program participants.77 As a result, trade pref-
erence programs become empty gestures of assistance with de-
veloped countries expending little actual effort. 
Developed countries often restrict their product coverage in 
order to protect domestic industries.78 The concern is that if a 
country is granted duty-free treatment for a product that do-
mestic suppliers produce, the foreign supplier will gain a com-
petitive advantage over the domestic supplier, which could shut 
out domestic suppliers from the market and cause domestic job 
loss.79 Two contrasting points arise from this concern. First, 
trade preference programs inherently protect against the con-
cern that developing countries may unnecessarily take advan-
tage of the trade preferences.80 Once a country exports a quota 
amount of product, the country no longer receives duty-free 
treatment for the remainder of that year.81 For example, the 
U.S. GSP program revokes duty-free treatment if the imports 
account for fifty percent or more of the value of total U.S. im-
ports of that product, or exceed a certain dollar value, which in 
2011 is $145 million.82 The purpose of trade preference pro-
grams is to aid struggling developing countries just enough so 
 
 75. See Moss, supra note 9, at 676–77 (outlining steps necessary to qualify 
for preferential treatment). 
 76. E.g., GSP-Eligible Products, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http:// 
www.ustr.gov/trade-topics/trade-development/preference-programs/generalized 
-system-preference-gsp/gsp-program-i-0 (last visited Mar. 4, 2011). 
 77. See Moss, supra note 9, at 671–72. 
 78. See Ochieng, supra note 11, at 381 (finding that product coverage ex-
cludes sensitive industries). 
 79. See Generalized System of Preferences Renewal Act of 1984, Pub. L. 
No. 98-573, § 501(b)(10)(A), 98 Stat. 3018, 3018 (stating that the purpose of 
the Act is to promote trade in a manner that “does not adversely affect United 
States producers and workers”). 
 80. See Leal-Arcas, supra note 1, at 359 (stating that there is “graduation 
for product groups where competitiveness has increased”); Moss, supra note 9, 
at 670. 
 81. See supra note 80. 
 82. See U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) Guidebook, supra 
note 50, at 11.  
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that they can enter foreign markets and grow their econo-
mies.83 Thus, the concern that the domestic supplier will be un-
fairly disadvantaged is unfounded: the developing country 
stops receiving benefits when they become truly competitive 
with domestic suppliers.84 Further, the benefits of efficient in-
ternational trade outweigh the short-term need to protect do-
mestic suppliers.85 A larger and more efficient global economy 
helps all countries trade more and improves their relations.86  
Second, free market and free trade principles propose that 
a country should manufacture products for which it has a com-
parative advantage.87 If the domestic supplier cannot compete 
with a foreign producer, then its failure likely suggests it 
should enter a different industry. The domestic supplier should 
focus on skills or resources in which foreign countries are less 
strong, in order to gain the comparative advantage.88 The con-
cepts of “supply and demand” and comparative advantage sug-
gest that consumers will seek the best deal, and that countries 
should not prevent parties from selling goods at more competi-
tive prices.89 Tariffs on developing countries’ products cut into 
 
 83. See SEC’Y-GEN., supra note 3, at 9. 
 84. See id. at 20, 23. 
 85. See MURRAY, supra note 13, at 21. 
 86. See Leal-Arcas, supra note 1, at 346. 
 87. See DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND 
TAXATION (1821), reprinted in 1 THE WORKS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF DAVID 
RICARDO 373–78 (Piero Sraffa ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1951); see also Paul 
Krugman, Ricardo’s Difficult Idea (Mar. 1996) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://web.mit.edu/krugman/www/ricardo.htm (“‘According to Ri-
cardo, each nation should specialize in those activities in which it excels, so 
that it can have the greatest advantage relative to other countries. Thus, a na-
tion should narrow its focus of activity, abandoning certain industries and de-
veloping those in which it has the largest comparative advantage. As a result, 
international trade would grow as nations export their surpluses and import 
the products that they no longer manufacture, efficiency and productivity 
would increase in line with economies of scale and prosperity would be en-
hanced.’” (quoting JAMES GOLDSMITH, THE TRAP 1 (1994))); Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, Glossary, U.S. DEPARTMENT LABOR, http://www.bls.gov/bls/glossary 
.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2011) (defining comparative advantage as: “When 
one nation’s opportunity cost of producing an item is less than another na-
tion’s opportunity cost of producing that item. A good or service with which a 
nation has the largest absolute advantage (or smallest absolute disadvantage) 
is the item for which they have a comparative advantage.”). 
 88. See Krugman, supra note 87 (discussing the economic gains that re-
sult when workers move into industries in which the nation has a comparative 
advantage). 
 89. Wentong Zheng, The Pitfalls of the (Perfect) Market Benchmark: The 
Case of Countervailing Duty Law, 19 MINN. J. INT’L L. 1, 13 (2010) (stating 
that “resources flow to their most profitable and efficient uses” (citing Carbon 
  
1504 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [95:1490 
 
any advantage from low-input costs the producer may have and 
thus make their potentially more efficient product less desira-
ble.90 Therefore, developed countries should not try to prevent 
competition.  
The main problem regarding product scope is that the 
omission of sensitive products excludes key industries that 
could significantly benefit developing countries and fuel eco-
nomic growth.91 Primarily, preference programs exclude tex-
tiles, apparel, and agriculture from duty-free treatment.92 
These fields tend to be very important areas for the economic 
development of many countries, especially low-income develop-
ing countries.93 Developing countries would have more oppor-
tunities to use trade preferences if they received duty-free 
treatment for these types of products.94 However, sensitive do-
mestic industries bar these items to protect themselves.95 For 
example, the United States protects the textile and agricultural 
industries to ensure their survival against potentially cheaper 
foreign products.96 As a result, there is a gap between the de-
veloping countries’ exports of beneficiaries and the product cov-
erage in trade preference programs.97 If developed countries 
opened up product coverage to include more items in textiles, 
 
Steel Wire Rod from Poland; Final Negative Countervailing Duty Determina-
tion, 49 Fed. Reg. 19,374, 19,375 (May 7, 1984))). 
 90. See Whitney J. Smith, Trade Adjustment Assistance: An Underdevel-
oped Alternative to Import Restrictions, 56 ALB. L. REV. 943, 943 n.3 (1993) 
(describing the negative impact of tariffs on a domestic economy). 
 91. See Edwini Kessie, The Legal Status of Special and Differential 
Treatment Provisions Under the WTO Agreements, in WTO LAW AND 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 61, at 12, 13–14. 
 92. See Moss, supra note 9, at 671–72; see also GALLAGHER, supra note 31, 
at 31; Kessie, supra note 91, at 14 (highlighting a weakness due to “‘exclusion 
of sensitive products which are of export interest to developing countries’” 
(quoting Bonapas F. Onguglo, Developing Countries and Trade Preferences, in 
TRADE RULES IN THE MAKING: CHALLENGES IN REGIONAL AND MULTILATERAL 
NEGOTIATIONS 119 (Miguel R. Mendoza et al. eds., 1999))). 
 93. See Lawrence, supra note 66, at 57–58 (“[T]he full array of GATT rules 
has not been extended to sectors such as agriculture which are vital to many 
developing countries . . . .”). 
 94. See Kessie, supra note 91, at 14. 
 95. Shellyn G. McCaffrey, North American Free Trade and Labor Issues: 
Accomplishments and Challenges, 10 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 449, 462 (1993) (stat-
ing that sensitive industries in the United States are “manufacturers of foot-
wear, ceramic tile, and glassware and growers of fruits and vegetables” and 
that a flood of imports would hurt those domestic producers). For an argument 
against needing to protect domestic industries, see infra Part III.B.3. 
 96. McCaffrey, supra note 95, at 462. 
 97. See Kessie, supra note 91, at 14. 
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apparel, and agriculture, trade preference programs may be-
come more utilized and thus more effective. 
In contrast, current product coverage focuses too much on 
useless products.98 The developing country may not even pro-
duce the covered products, or such products may comprise only 
a tiny part of their market where utilization of duty-free treat-
ment will not help the developing country grow economically.99 
Providing preferences for impractical products is an empty ges-
ture that illuminates the lack of effectiveness of trade prefer-
ence programs. The key is to expand product coverage to prod-
ucts that the developing countries show strength in producing. 
Though that may make it more difficult for domestic suppliers, 
in the long term an efficient international economy will produce 
justifiable benefits.100 Hence, developing countries’ potential in 
an industry coupled with their inability to infiltrate foreign 
markets,101 which they would be able to do if not for the gov-
ernment-imposed trade barriers, implies that such countries 
need help to gain access to foreign markets. The duty-free 
treatment may provide enough assistance so they can enter 
foreign markets and grow economically while helping the in-
ternational economy reach maximum productivity. 
The success of AGOA in relation to the other programs 
demonstrates the importance of product coverage to the success 
of trade preference programs.102 While most programs limit 
coverage and consequently their success,103 AGOA has more 
coverage and is reputed to be more successful than other trade 
preference programs.104 Specifically, AGOA allows eligible ap-
 
 98. See, e.g., id. 
 99. See Johnson, supra note 61, at 72 (arguing that it would be beneficial 
to give “priority to products that the less developed countries have already 
shown a capacity to export competitively (in contrast to the infant-industry 
arguments for confining preferences to products they cannot export competi-
tively at present)”). 
 100. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 87.  
 101. See, e.g., SEC’Y-GEN., supra note 3, at 9. 
 102. See Moss, supra note 9, at 668.  
 103. Cf. Lawrence, supra note 66, at 57 (discussing proposals to broaden 
the scope of GATT). 
 104. See Moss, supra note 9, at 676, 680–81; see also African Growth and 
Opportunity Act, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/trade 
-topics/trade-development/preference-programs/african-growth-and-opportunity 
-act-agoa (last visited Mar. 4, 2011). 
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parel articles and most agricultural goods.105 AGOA country 
participants likely utilize the program more than other devel-
oping countries because of the more expansive coverage.106 For 
instance, from 1999 to 2003, apparel exports increased 176 per-
cent while vehicles and parts exports increased by 424 per-
cent.107 Thus, if other trade preference programs expand their 
coverage, it seems likely that they will be more successful. 
In short, product coverage is a significant problem for trade 
preference programs. Developed countries do not provide duty-
free treatment for products that may actually assist developing 
countries. Reviewing the eligible products list and including 
more appropriate products would help promote economic 
growth in developing countries. 
B. THE SHORT-TERM NATURE OF THE PROGRAMS  
Another weakness related to the implementation and 
structure of current trade preference programs that likely im-
pacts such programs’ potential is that they typically receive on-
ly short-term renewals.108 Because even a WTO waiver is not 
indefinite,109 countries cannot establish permanent programs 
that are effective. The reasoning behind annual renewals is 
that trade preference programs facilitate economic growth until 
countries can fairly compete under the MFN rule, so the pro-
grams do not need to exist beyond their utility and must be re-
viewed regularly.110 This short-term characteristic, however, 
weakens the programs and possibly infringes on its effective-
ness. 
Developed countries may not allocate as much funding to 
the programs as they would if the programs were more perma-
nent.111 For example, the U.S. GSP program is extremely un-
 
 105. See Moss, supra note 9, at 677–78; Fact Sheet on AGOA, OFF. U.S. 
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (2009), http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/AGOA% 
20Fact%20Sheet%2003.09.pdf. 
 106. See Fact Sheet on AGOA, supra note 105 (stating that non-oil AGOA 
imports increased by fifty-one percent in 2008). 
 107. See Moss, supra note 9, at 680. 
 108. See id. at 671–72; see also, e.g., Kelly Chen et al., Customs Law, 43 
INT’L LAW. 289, 303–04 (2009) (stating that Congress passed a one-year re-
newal of the GSP program in 2008). 
 109. See, e.g., Marinberg, supra note 32, at 134. 
 110. See Moss, supra note 9, at 670 (discussing graduation). 
 111. See Telephone Interview with Marideth Sandler, supra note 5 (noting 
that the unknown future of the program makes it hard to request more funding). 
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derstaffed and overworked.112 If a developed country believes 
the program may not be renewed, it likely will not continue to 
put effort and time into something that soon will not exist. Fur-
ther, frequent renewals may prevent developing countries from 
engaging in long-term planning because the program’s future 
existence is uncertain.113 This uncertainty undermines the pro-
grams since countries may not believe they are a usable tool.114 
Allocation of resources limits developing countries.115 Even if 
they know about the potential benefits of a trade preference 
program with a developed country, and even if their exports are 
covered under the eligibility list, they may not want to expend 
the time and energy to learn about and utilize trade preference 
programs if they are unsure that they will be around for much 
longer. It may not be profitable and worthwhile to begin the 
process of preparing the product for export if there is a chance 
that by the time they are able to begin profitably exporting, the 
trade preference may no longer be usable.116 AGOA provides an 
interesting contrast: Congress renewed the program through 
September 2015 in the AGOA Acceleration Act of 2004.117 
AGOA may be more successful because it is long term, and is 
thus a reliable undertaking to provide trade preferences.118 
Governments should similarly enact other GSP programs for a 
longer period of time.  
Another problematic aspect for trade programs is that they 
are not concretely accepted under WTO law.119 A “cloud of un-
certainty” regarding the legality surrounds the programs, such 
as the EU’s GSP Plus arrangement.120 Accordingly, even if a 
country enacts a program with a sufficient period of existence, 
there are always the foundational questions about whether the 
program is legal under WTO law and, if not, whether it will ex-
 
 112. See id. 
 113. See Marinberg, supra note 32, at 134. 
 114. See Moss, supra note 9, at 671–72. 
 115. Cf. Alexandros Zervos, Linking Natural Resource Exploitation and 
Primary Health Care in Developing Countries, 11 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN 
AFF. 227, 228 (2006) (showing how developing countries have problems with 
health care resulting from issues with resource allocation because of limited 
funds and occasional corruption). 
 116. See Hunter R. Clark, African “Renaissance” and U.S. Trade Policy, 27 
GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 265, 269 n.22 (1999) (contrasting export industries’ 
high start-up costs with the short-term nature of trade preference programs). 
 117. See Moss, supra note 9, at 678. 
 118. See, e.g., id. 
 119. See Amao, supra note 63, at 396. 
 120. Id. 
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ist for much longer. It seems likely that this issue also weakens 
the reliability and effectiveness of trade preference programs. 
Even if short-term approval for the program does not deter de-
veloping countries from using trade preference programs, the 
uncertainty may prevent the program employees from engaging 
in long-term and possibly beneficial planning or ideas.121 
If the enacted programs do not present a reliable option, 
people in both developed and developing countries will not take 
the preferences seriously. They may not utilize the preferences, 
which may explain the current lack of observed achievement. 
In order to provide lasting economic growth, trade programs 
must last beyond a couple of years. 
C. INITIAL AND OVERLOOKED HURDLES FOR EXPORTERS 
Even if developed countries present a perfectly created 
trade preference program that deals with optimal products and 
contains a long mandate, exporters in developing countries face 
significant domestic hurdles they must overcome before they 
can profitably export. If they want to sincerely assist with eco-
nomic growth, trade preference programs need to address the 
foundational problems facing developing country exporters by 
providing crucial and profit-maximizing information. 
In order to participate in trade preference programs, devel-
oping countries must meet varied requirements that pose sig-
nificant obstacles.122 For instance, if such country’s product is a 
food item, it must meet stringent sanitary and phytosanitary 
standards, which can take years to accomplish.123 Additionally, 
complying with the standards can be costly, which further im-
pinges on the program’s realistic and perceived utility.124 Even 
though the standards are necessary for health concerns, trade 
preference programs should take the related expenses into ac-
count and adjust benefits accordingly, or even provide relevant 
information and tips to help exporters begin to efficiently plan 
 
 121. Cf. Moss, supra note 9, at 671–72. 
 122. See Kessie, supra note 91, at 14 (listing obstacles such as rules of ori-
gins, quotas, designation criteria, and noneconomic conditions); Tomazos, su-
pra note 71, at 318 (suggesting other reasons for lack of success). 
 123. See J. Michael Finger & Philip Schuler, Implementation of Uruguay 
Round Commitments: The Development Challenge, 23 WORLD ECON. 511, 517–
19 (2000) (discussing the multiyear process required to comply with interna-
tional sanitation standards for exports). 
 124. See id. at 518–19, 525 (discussing Argentina’s $80 million program to 
comply with export sanitation standards and the potential cost of similar 
projects).  
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their future.125 Thus, more information or increased GSP bene-
fits would help override government-imposed costs, those that 
would not be present in a free market, so that the global econ-
omy reaches maximum efficiency. Developing countries often 
claim that preferences would be helpful if they were more at-
tainable.126 
Further, even if exporters meet the requirements, they 
must deal with internal obstacles that add to the high cost of 
exporting. For example, exporters in developing countries typi-
cally have less effective distribution channels.127 In order to ef-
ficiently export their products, they should have reliable infra-
structure and find ways to distribute their goods in the most 
profitable way.128 A related point is that they also face prob-
lems with effective marketing.129 Even if they successfully ex-
port their products, there may not be any consumer demand in 
the developed country because of lack of marketing and effec-
tive distributors. This negates both their and the trade prefer-
ence program’s goal. It may cost too much for the venture to be 
profitable if the exporter hires an effective marketer or distrib-
utor.130 Developing countries also face a problem with infre-
quent domestic transportation.131 The effort to find reliable 
ground transportation to lessen shipping expenses may not 
even make the endeavor to utilize the program worthwhile.132 
These factors all produce a very high production cost that cuts 
into the profitability and, thus, the desire to utilize trade pref-
erence programs. 
Given all of the initial costs to export and market, the 
small margin of benefits from using the programs further hin-
ders its profitability.133 If the regular tariff reductions that all 
 
 125. See id. at 524 (discussing the role the WTO can play in investment-
development standards needed to comply with trade standards). 
 126. See Kessie, supra note 91, at 14. 
 127. Cf. Ari Bessendorf, Note, Games in the Hothouse: Theoretical Dimen-
sions in Climate Change, 28 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 325, 328 (2005) 
(stating that developing countries have underdeveloped infrastructure and 
lack of resources). 
 128. See MURRAY, supra note 13, at 147. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id.  
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. See UNCTAD, Industrial Exports from the Developing Countries and 
Preferences, in TOWARDS A NEW TRADE POLICY FOR DEVELOPMENT: REPORT BY 
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE 
AND DEVELOPMENT (1964), reprinted in TRADE PREFERENCES AND 
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countries receive come close to the duty-free treatment of trade 
preference products,134 potential exporters may not even at-
tempt to take advantage of the program. For example, the duty 
rate for dried apricots is merely 1.8 cents per kilogram.135 As a 
result, the benefit of using GSP may not be worth the effort if 
the exporter saves very little in the transaction. In that situa-
tion, the potential exporters will not expand their market and 
their country will not have the desired economic growth. 
Trade preference programs also need to take into account 
the initial hurdles exporters must face. For example, the pro-
grams can provide information on the most cost-effective means 
of transportation and other pertinent information. If the coun-
try in question does not change the legislation behind trade 
preference programs, exporters may rarely use trade prefer-
ences in the way intended, and economic development will take 
longer. In sum, developed countries are not fulfilling their obli-
gations to help developing countries since they basically pro-
vide ineffective and impractical benefits through the current 
trade preference programs. Product coverage is not specific 
enough to provide meaningful aid to the developing countries. 
Further, the programs’ unreliability weakens their usefulness 
and makes them an impractical resource. Lastly, the exporters 
themselves face significant hurdles that trade preference pro-
grams overlook. 
III.  ACTIVE REPRESENTATION OF EXPORTERS FROM 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES   
While there may be other solutions to help developing 
countries secure economic growth, this Note focuses solely on 
how to improve the existing trade preference programs. In or-
der to improve the effectiveness of GSP, lawmakers, through 
legislation, need to change the structure and role of trade pref-
erence programs to act as exporters’ agents. Though it would be 
best if the changes were widespread throughout international 
 
DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 61, at 3, 
13 (“A small margin of preference is not likely to provide adequate incentives 
for establishing new export industries in developing countries. If a new system 
of preferences is worth introducing at all, the margins of preference should 
provide incentives that are clearly adequate in relation to the magnitude of 
the problem.”). 
 134. Id. 
 135. U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE 
UNITED STATES ch. 8 (2010), available at http://www.usitc.gov/publications/ 
docs/tata/hts/bychapter/1000C08.pdf. 
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policy, the United States at the very least should enforce them. 
The program’s change in role would more effectively assist ex-
porters and, consequently, benefit international trade. Further, 
a developed country would reap benefits beyond the altruistic 
desire to aid developing countries and alleviate global poverty. 
The greater spread of industrialization means that world trade 
would be closer to reaching an efficient market with the lowest 
consumer prices.136 Lower prices may induce countries to not 
engage in protectionism.137 Also, there would be more oppor-
tunities for developed countries to create and support more 
specialized jobs.138 Lastly, though there may be the concern 
about the unfairness of one’s country helping foreign, but not 
domestic, producers, the program is only for qualified develop-
ing countries that need the benefits to overcome trade barriers 
(which domestic suppliers do not face) to maximize efficiency. 
A. BENEFITS OF IMPLEMENTING THE PROPOSED SOLUTION 
If trade preference programs shift their role so their em-
ployees more actively represent and assist developing country 
exporters within the developed country, numerous benefits 
would arise. First, if the role of trade preference programs is to 
represent exporters, like an agent, the program should provide 
more individual attention regarding product coverage. Current-
ly, trade preference programs, such as the U.S. GSP, already 
give some specialized attention to countries regarding products 
and new profitable areas for exporters.139 In meetings and 
presentations, the program employees highlight products that 
countries specialize in that can be exported under duty-free 
treatment.140 Thus, they inform the developing countries of op-
portunities to take complete advantage of every product under 
 
 136. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 87. 
 137. Alan O. Sykes, Regulatory Protectionism and the Law of International 
Trade, 66 U CHI. L. REV. 1, 5 (1999) (“Protectionism draws high cost domestic 
firms into the market while excluding low cost foreign firms, and it prices out 
of the market some consumers who would be willing to purchase goods at a 
price exceeding the marginal cost of production of efficient suppliers.”). 
 138. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 87. 
 139. See Telephone Interview with Marideth Sandler, supra note 5; GSP in 
Use—Country Specific Information, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http:// 
www.ustr.gov/trade-topics/trade-development/preference-programs/generalized 
-system-preferences-gsp/gsp-use-%E2%80%93-coun (last visited Mar. 4, 2011) 
(listing links to country-specific PowerPoint presentations showing the pro-
gram’s country-specific efforts).  
 140. Telephone Interview with Marideth Sandler, supra note 5. 
  
1512 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [95:1490 
 
the current products list.141 However, the U.S. GSP is under-
staffed so it can only sincerely focus on a few countries at a 
time.142 Hence, legislation needs to set aside more funding and 
resources to increase the staff so that there will be more di-
rected attention to the participating developing countries.143 
Another benefit from directed attention is that the employees 
may discover, through detailed economic analysis and discus-
sion with exporters, new and useful areas that are not included 
in the product coverage.144 Then, programs can attempt, as ad-
vocates for the developing country, to get the new product or 
industry onto the GSP-eligible products list. If the programs 
have more resources and employees, they would deal with more 
countries, exporters, and their products to get more results for 
developing countries. 
Second, an increase in resources to allow the program to ef-
fectively represent developing countries would signal the devel-
oped countries’ determined and sincere effort to help developing 
countries industrialize and grow. It would make the program 
reliable and would help make international trade efficient. In-
creased funding may also present the idea that the developed 
country supports the program and would attempt to keep the 
program running. Therefore, it would be a stable and responsi-
ble route for exporters to take since the increased funding les-
sens the gamble of depending on the continuation of trade pref-
erence benefits. 
Third, the program’s employees should encourage “export-
mindedness,”145 which means that the developing-country pro-
ducers would want to send their products to other countries de-
spite the difficulties and high costs.146 The program representa-
tive would provide exporters, and even locals for posterity, with 
relevant information to make the exporting process easier.147 
 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. See infra Part III.B.3 for a discussion of why Congress should increase 
funding for GSP. 
 144. See GSP in Use—Country Specific Information, supra note 139 (show-
ing the country-specific efforts that point out possible products).  
 145. See UNCTAD, supra note 133, at 3, 20 (“[I]t is necessary to induce ex-
port-mindedness.”). 
 146. See id.; Christian Wilhelms, Export Drive by a Developing Country, 2 
INTERECONOMICS 209, 211 (1967) (discussing Brazil’s (then) new export- 
oriented trade policy). 
 147. Exporters may not be aware they are missing out on other export op-
portunities. CHRISTOPHER STEVENS & JANE KENNAN, MAKING TRADE 
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The programs’ employees should first find “clients” in develop-
ing countries. Though the U.S. GSP already meets with ambas-
sadors and diplomats, travels to foreign countries to give in-
formational presentations, and attends trade fairs, the lack of 
resources limits their ability to consistently and ardently en-
gage in thorough maximizing efforts.148 More resources would 
lead to more exposure, allowing GSP to provide exporters with 
useful information to make sure they claim every possible bene-
fit. The information should range from product coverage, to 
how best to deal with eligibility and rule of origin require-
ments, to the best methods of transportation. This would facili-
tate the process of encouraging producers to export their prod-
ucts.149 Further, the programs should advocate that it is worth 
using them, even if there is just a small margin of benefits. 
They should assuage any fears and concerns that the exporters 
may have and provide them with the information that would 
maximize their exports. 
Lastly, the programs need to represent the developing 
countries by acting as their marketers. Even if a producer ex-
ports its product to a developed country, if there is no demand, 
then there will be no profit and the producer will no longer ex-
port the product and use the trade preference benefit.150 Prefer-
ence program employees should work within their developed 
country to market the product and find profitable distribution 
centers. If they succeed, they would help the exporter maximize 
their profitability. Further, the assistance would merely act as 
a way to lessen trade barriers to maximize market efficiency, 
rather than unfairly provide an advantage.151  
The United States currently has regional programs that 
show it recognizes the benefit in giving more specific attention 
to developing countries.152 However, those programs are not ac-
complishing enough.153 The proposed changes differ from the 
 
PREFERENCES MORE EFFECTIVE 6 (2004) (“Everyone knows about AGOA but 
hardly anyone who is not already exporting to Europe knows about Cotonou.”). 
 148. Telephone Interview with Marideth Sandler, supra note 5 (discussing 
the staffing and budget problems encountered by GSP). 
 149. See id. (discussing what GSP would do to promote trade). 
 150. See RICARDO, supra note 87, at 374–75.  
 151. See, e.g., Steven L. Snell, The Development of Competition Policy in the 
People’s Republic of China, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 575, 584 n.30 (1996) 
(explaining that barriers to entry can artificially inflate prices compared to a 
competitive market). 
 152. See, e.g., Andean Trade Preferences Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3201 (2006); 
Trade Policy for Sub-Saharan Africa, id. § 3701.  
 153. See Moss, supra note 9, at 671.  
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regional trade preference programs because the shift in roles is 
more proactive and responsive to initial hurdles. A representa-
tive role ensures focused attention for developing countries so 
that they maximize their benefits from trade preference pro-
grams.154 A shift in roles would make trade preference pro-
grams useful and help the developing countries grow economi-
cally and industrialize, whether by providing information on 
the existence of trade preference programs, encouraging “ex-
port-mindedness,” or by helping to market the product.155 The 
proposed changes, however, likely face a few significant hur-
dles.  
B. POSSIBLE ISSUES WITH EXPANDING THE ROLE OF TRADE 
PREFERENCE PROGRAMS 
There are a few important issues with the recommended 
changes. Such issues challenge the possibility and legality of 
making trade preference programs act as the exporters’ repre-
sentatives. The first concern is that the additional resources 
required by an expanded GSP program expand the degree of 
departure from the MFN rule. Second, increased involvement 
by the programs may interfere with the free market. Third, the 
public may perceive developed country governments as putting 
the interests of foreigners before their own citizens. Nonethe-
less, each concern lacks sufficient weight to prevent the imple-
mentation of this Note’s solution. 
1. The Proposed Solution Approaches Violation of the MFN 
Rule 
A realistic concern is that the proposed changes to trade 
preference programs create too much differential treatment be-
tween countries.156 Developed countries provide a sizable ad-
vantage to developing countries if the wealthy countries devote 
more resources to programs to help a select few enter domestic 
developed country markets to profitably sell the developing 
 
 154. See Telephone Interview with Marideth Sandler, supra note 5 (dis-
cussing difficulties in making opportunities known to LDCs). 
 155. See id.  
 156. If S&DT goes too far beyond the Enabling Clause, it would violate the 
MFN rule of equal treatment. Compare Enabling Clause, supra note 37, at 203 
(authorizing differential treatment), with GATT, supra note 22, art. I (stipu-
lating the MFN rule). 
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country’s merchandise.157 The advantage very well might cross 
the line between what the Enabling Clause allows and the 
MFN rule requires.158 Thus, some may argue that the proposed 
changes violate WTO principles and are illegal. 
These concerns, however, are not different from those 
present even before the inception of S&DT.159 The S&DT prin-
ciple acknowledges that WTO members are not yet all at the 
same level of development to fairly be subjected to the MFN 
rule.160 Developed countries should engage in behavior, such as 
trade preferences, that aids developing countries to grow eco-
nomically so that the MFN rule can fairly be applicable to all 
countries.161 Further, international trade will be more efficient 
and all countries will benefit.162 Expanding the role of trade 
programs to become representatives of developing countries 
should not be considered a significant change in policy that jus-
tifies declaring a violation of the MFN rule. Further, the Enabl-
ing Clause only requires that preferences are generalized, non-
reciprocal, and nondiscriminatory, characteristics that still 
exist with the proposed changes.163 Thus, the alterations would 
not be illegal under the MFN rule.  
2. Increased Government Involvement May Interfere with the 
Free Market 
The demand for increased governmental involvement in 
the free market is another concern. A principle of the free mar-
ket system is that the government should not excessively regu-
late so that the market can reach a natural balance.164 If the 
 
 157. But see sources cited supra note 30. These authors emphasize the need 
for differential treatment until countries are at a more equal stage of devel-
opment.  
 158. See Enabling Clause, supra note 37, at 203–04. 
 159. See Moon, supra note 24, at 620 (discussing the motivations behind 
the MFN rule). 
 160. See GALLAGHER, supra note 31, at 22 (discussing some WTO agree-
ments that favor LDCs); sources cited supra note 30.  
 161. See Ochieng, supra note 11, at 374–75. 
 162. See generally Krugman, supra note 87 (explaining how even trade be-
tween countries with disparate levels of value is efficient and can benefit both 
countries). 
 163. See Bartels, supra note 15, at 522; see also Moss, supra note 9, at 670 
(explaining the principle of graduation). 
 164. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 87 (discussing comparative advan-
tage); cf. Hearing Designation Order, Application of EchoStar Communica-
tions Corporation, General Motors Corporation, and Hughes Electronics Cor-
poration, Transferors & EchoStar Communications Corporation, Transferee, 
17 FCC Rcd. 20,559, 20,629 n.184 (2002) (rejecting the applicants’ national 
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government enacts a program that aggressively brings new ac-
tors into the market that may not otherwise enter, the govern-
ment skews the free market and competition.165 Only the best 
products at the cheapest prices should thrive in the market-
place, so a program that advocates the purchase of a certain 
item may squeeze out of the market more efficiently produced 
products.166 If the market seeks to maximize everyone’s com-
parative advantage, the program possibly provides a false ad-
vantage that may hurt the consumer market if prices drastical-
ly increase once the developing country graduates from duty-
free treatment.167 
Nonetheless, the increased role of government would only 
benefit products that have a viable future, based on economic 
analysis, and that would otherwise be successful products in 
the market if not for initial barriers such as the tariff rates and 
lack of resources to find potential buyers.168 Trade preferences 
are meant only to assist countries, not force wealth onto 
them.169 Further, the proposed changes are meant to provide a 
comparative advantage only for the countries that most need it 
in order to industrialize. The changes only provide an initial 
advantage which should not significantly affect free market 
principles.170 More importantly, the changes lessen govern-
ment-imposed barriers that hinder the free market. Therefore, 
the concern of excessive interference is unfounded. 
 
pricing plan, which would replace competition with regulatory oversight, con-
flicting “with the goal of allowing competition to replace regulation, that both 
Congress and this Commission have long sought to achieve”); Leigh M. Murray, 
Comment, Sirius Mistake: The FCC’s Failure to Stop a Merger to Monopoly in 
Satellite Radio, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 83, 109 (2009) (highlighting the FCC’s “stated 
preference for free market competition” (citing 17 FCC Rcd. at 20,629)). 
 165. Cf. 17 FCC Rcd. at 20,629 (explaining how price controls might count-
erintuitively lead to collusion and higher prices). 
 166. See Krugman, supra note 87 (discussing, in part, how market distor-
tions can undermine efficiencies from specialization). 
 167. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 87 (defining comparative 
advantage). 
 168. See Clark, supra note 116, at 269 n.22. 
 169. See Ochieng, supra note 11, at 374–75 (noting that LDCs can modify 
certain GATT provisions if they feel it is in their interests). 
 170. The domestic railroad system in the United States grew to maturity 
under industrial policies that favored railroad growth—akin to an initial com-
parative advantage for an infant industry. Lane Kirkland, Industrial Policy: 
An Answer to Economic Chaos, 5 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 23, 73–74 (1993). 
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3. The Conflicting Duty Toward Domestic Constituency and 
Global Trade 
Lastly, this strategy requires the program to prioritize the 
exporter’s interest over a domestic producer’s success. Domestic 
producers and taxpayers may disagree with the use of their tax 
payments to help foreigners compete and sell products.171 The 
developed country’s government may face loyalty questions on 
whether it should change the program to benefit global trade or 
follow the short-term desires of its domestic constituency. 
Taxpayers may even feel that the government uses the 
country’s wealth to unfairly aid strong nations, such as Chi-
na,172 in selling its products. Trade preference programs, how-
ever, only help developing countries that qualify based on eco-
nomic development, which should diminish this concern since 
well-off countries like China do not qualify.173 Further, the pro-
grams have a safety trigger whereby countries that successfully 
export a product past a certain quota no longer qualify for duty-
free treatment.174 Consequently, taxpayers’ concern that pro-
posed changes would assist developing countries dominate do-
mestic markets is unfounded, since the programs only help 
countries that have difficulty exporting their goods and are un-
able to enter the international market.  
Additionally, the concern mirrors the idea of the MFN rule: 
one should not provide special treatment.175 However, the WTO 
recognized that S&DT is understandable in certain situations, 
one of which is providing trade preferences.176 This Note’s pro-
posed expansion does not mean that developed countries will 
not protect their own producers. The program would only act as 
a local representative, and domestic producers would compete 
 
 171. Domestic producers may disagree when it hurts their own industries. 
However, protectionism is inefficient for international trade and should be 
avoided. See Robert W. McGee, An Economic Analysis of Protectionism in the 
United States with Implications for International Trade in Europe, 26 GEO. 
WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 539, 539 (1993). 
 172. See Mark S. Blodgett, Foreign Direct Investment, Trade, and China’s 
Competition Laws, 37 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 201, 201 (2009) (commenting 
on the strength of China); Markets for Referrals, 28 LEGAL MGMT., no. 3, April 
2009 at 1, 8 (noting China’s strong presence in the global economy).  
 173. See Information on Countries Eligible for GSP, supra note 3. 
 174. See Moss, supra note 9, at 670 (explaining that developing countries 
no longer qualify for GSP once they graduate).  
 175. See GATT, supra note 22, art. I, para. 1. 
 176. See Enabling Clause, supra note 37, at 203 (“Notwithstanding the 
provision of Article I of the General Agreement, contracting parties may ac-
cord differential and more favourable treatment to developing countries . . . .”). 
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with foreigners as they compete with the domestic competition. 
Furthermore, the long-term benefits for all parties involved—
such as more jobs, higher GDPs, and increased global trade—
maximize as developing countries industrialize.177 Moreover, 
duty-free treatment benefits only a few countries.178 Taxpayers 
should not be concerned that their government’s actions work 
against what is best for them. The preference program merely 
serves as a way to make it easier to help developing countries 
export more so they can grow economically, which eventually 
benefits everyone.179  
C. THE LEGALITY OF THE PROPOSED SOLUTION 
The proposed expansion of the program’s role that calls for 
more active representation may face opposition for stepping 
beyond the boundaries that the WTO permits under the Enabl-
ing Clause and MFN rule.180 Nonetheless, the need to assist 
developing countries with industrialization outweighs the po-
tential problems. Also, the proposed changes are very similar to 
the GSP Plus programs and the current failure of those pro-
grams may even qualify as an “exceptional circumstance.” 
1. The View that Trade Preference Programs Should Be 
Mandatory Suggests Support for an Increased Role 
The current ineffectiveness of trade preference programs 
implies that developed countries are not taking their goals se-
riously.181 If they were, they would likely have attempted to 
change their programs to find a more productive strategy. A 
minority view is that all developed countries should grant trade 
preferences.182 A possible reason for trade preference programs’ 
modest results is that few provide duty-free treatment; trade 
preferences would work better for economic growth if every able 
 
 177. Cf. Krugman, supra note 87 (describing Ricardo’s thesis that indus-
trialization and specialization in developing nations increases global GDP). 
 178. E.g., Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), supra note 49 (showing 
that only 131 countries benefit from the U.S. GSP program). 
 179. See generally Krugman, supra note 87 (explaining the concepts of 
comparative advantage and absolute growth). 
 180. See Moss, supra note 9, at 670 (briefly describing the scope of the 
S&DT and MFN doctrines). 
 181. See Generalized System of Preferences Renewal Act of 1984, Pub. L. 
No. 98-573, § 501(b)(10)(A), 98 Stat. 3018, 3018 (lacking clear language that 
would give the statute real power to affect change); SEC’Y-GEN., supra note 3, 
at 12–13. 
 182. See Bartels, supra note 15, at 513. 
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country provided them.183 More developing countries would ex-
port to more countries which should lead to quicker results.184 
Even if every country does not provide them, the countries that 
currently offer benefits should change their structure to make 
their programs more efficient. 
A mandatory program is based on the belief that economic 
growth for developing countries is a vital interest.185 However, 
WTO members created the Enabling Clause to allow countries 
to engage in differential treatment, despite the MFN rule.186 
They likely made the Enabling Clause optional to allow for po-
litical considerations when granting trade preferences.187 To 
make trade programs mandatory would require an amendment 
to the WTO Agreement.188 
If the WTO refuses to make trade preference programs 
mandatory, the next best step, if the WTO is serious about 
helping developing countries, is to expand the program’s role to 
make the voluntary programs capable of accomplishing some-
thing more through increased authority and direction. Those 
who support a mandatory program likely support an expansion 
of the program, such as this Note’s proposed changes, since 
both recognize the importance of aiding developing countries 
and seek to make that happen.189 Thus, the solution achieves 
legitimacy in that it presents an option that is in the middle of 
two extremes—demanding mandatory trade preferences or set-
tling for the current ineffective programs. 
 
 183. See Moon, supra note 24, at 635 (“[T]oo few of the provisions impose 
binding obligations on the industrialized countries, with the result that the 
assistance described generally does not eventuate.”). 
 184. The purpose of GSP is to help developing countries overcome barriers 
that keep developing countries out of developed markets. See EUR. 
COMMISSION, supra note 48. 
 185. Moon, supra note 24, at 619; see also Bartels, supra note 15, at 511. 
 186. See supra Part I.A. 
 187. See Shun-yong Yeh, Dragging Out of or Deeper into Another Impasse 
of the Political Economy of the World Trade Organization? A Critic of the Find-
ings of the Dispute Settlement Body in European Communities—Conditions for 
the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, 1 ASIAN J. WTO & 
INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 465, 471 (2006) (“Due to the voluntary nature of GSP 
schemes, political considerations most obviously dominate any donor’s wil-
lingness in granting such preferences.”). 
 188. See id. at 470–71 (“[T]he granting of such system is essentially a ‘gift’ 
from developed countries with the consequence that any tight limitation on 
them will most likely put an end to the system altogether.”). 
 189. See, e.g., Moon, supra note 24, at 617 (“S&DT may be made stronger, 
more effective and more operational.”). 
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2. Comparison to GSP Plus Arrangements and Limiting the 
Solution to LDCs 
Despite potential concerns that the suggested modification 
is too expansive and violates the MFN rule, the proposal is very 
similar to GSP Plus, which lends legality to its enactment. GSP 
Plus grants additional preferences on items not included in the 
standard product coverage.190 It recognizes that the benefits 
from standard trade preference programs are insufficient to 
provide meaningful results, and hence attempts to improve 
them by expanding product coverage.191 The proposed changes 
similarly recognize flaws in the preference programs and at-
tempt to expand the programs’ utilization. However, instead of 
having broader product coverage, the proposed changes in-
crease the personnel that focus on developing countries, which 
can potentially expand product coverage as well as accomplish 
other utilization-increasing measures.192 The changes increase 
the attention paid to finding exporters and providing them with 
valuable information and encouraging them through the expor-
tation process. 
While the proposed changes are not entirely comparable to 
GSP Plus193 and, as a result, may conflict with the MFN rule, 
the proposed solution should only be applied to LDCs. GSP 
should offer heightened representation only to countries that 
meet certain standards, such as those offered under GSP 
Plus194 or LDCs. A more expansive coverage that extends to 
countries beyond LDCs may violate the MFN rule.195 Regard-
less, the proposed changes recognize the need to take extra 
measures for countries that need the most economic growth.196  
Applying the proposed solution solely to LDCs strengthens 
the legality of the program under international trade law.197 
 
 190. See Bartels, supra note 43, at 873–74 (discussing prescription drugs as 
an exception to the standard product coverage). 
 191. See, e.g., id. 
 192. See Telephone Interview with Marideth Sandler, supra note 5.  
 193. GSP primarily provides economic incentives to LDCs in the form of 
reduced tariffs. EUR. COMMISSION, supra note 48.  
 194. Bartels, supra note 43, at 871 (listing standards for countries seeking 
to qualify for GSP Plus benefits). 
 195. See supra Part I.A (discussing the MFN rule that initially precluded 
the possibility of giving trade benefits to developing countries until the global 
community gradually accepted the idea). 
 196. See EUR. COMMISSION, supra note 48. 
 197. Cf. Marinberg, supra note 32, at 130, 143 (explaining that exceptional 
circumstances including economic development may support S&DT). 
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The suggested alterations expand the level of focus and atten-
tion to specific countries that the WTO deems truly in need of 
aid to encourage utilization and profitability of the program.  
3. The Lack of Results May Qualify as an Exceptional 
Circumstance 
The current failure of trade preference programs supports 
the necessity of instituting the proposed changes because it ex-
emplifies the programs’ incompetency to carry out its goals.198 
Not only should something be done to help developing countries 
industrialize, but open markets and global industrialization 
promote key national interests.199 Increased competition means 
U.S. consumers can purchase products at the best price.200 The 
failure to industrialize developing countries, even after decades 
of trade preferences,201 suggests that the goal is complex and 
may qualify as an “exceptional circumstance” that requires a 
new form of solution to produce results.202 If the situation is an 
exceptional circumstance, developed countries may have a 
greater chance at receiving a WTO waiver and getting pro-
grams with a different focus and strategy.203  
The WTO grants waivers if there are exceptional circum-
stances.204 Despite the lack of concrete criteria, there are some 
factors that likely weigh toward getting a waiver.205 One con-
sideration is WTO precedent.206 If the United States received a 
waiver solely because “the Andean nations need[ed] to expand 
their trade and economies,” then the WTO should grant similar 
waivers for all trade programs that want to “expand their trade 
and economies.”207  
 
 198. See Leal-Arcas, supra note 1, at 346 (arguing that trade policies pro-
moting greater economic integration would promote greater economic devel-
opment and peace for all countries involved).  
 199. Id. 
 200. See Krugman, supra note 87. 
 201. Differential treatment was approved by the GATT in 1979. Enabling 
Clause, supra note 37, at 203. 
 202. See Marinberg, supra note 32, at 143 (stating that the absence of al-
ternatives, hardship, and lack of precedent are factors for determining “excep-
tional circumstances”). 
 203. See id. 
 204. Id. at 130, 133; Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 29, art. IX. 
 205. See generally Marinberg, supra note 32 (discussing what constitutes 
“exceptional circumstances”). 
 206. See id. at 143. 
 207. See id. at 151 (explaining the reasoning behind creating ATPA).  
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Another consideration is whether the proposal is an “ur-
gent policy objective” that cannot be accomplished through oth-
er means.208 The idea of helping developing countries, the sub-
sequent acceptance of S&DT within WTO principles, and the 
program’s enactment all show that the world considers assis-
tance urgent.209 Further, the developed countries’ strategy 
seems incomplete since it has not met the objective.210 At the 
very least, the ineffectiveness of the current programs shows 
that the issue is complex and not easily solved, especially with 
the current methods. The WTO must encourage a new strategy, 
such as the proposed solution, in order to achieve results. The 
WTO should grant a waiver to establish the proposed changes 
because the established trade preference programs are not feas-
ibly productive.  
The current situation needs change to become a more effec-
tive trade preference program. This Note advocates changing 
the role of the program to become the representative for expor-
ters, which would make it more efficient and helpful to develop-
ing countries. A program that focuses more attention on the 
specific needs of beneficiary countries by providing more infor-
mation and marketing products may encourage more program 
usage. Further, the proposed changes are compatible with ex-
isting trade law since they only provide S&DT to qualified de-
veloping countries. They are necessary because the current 
programs attempting to help developing countries industrialize 
are not efficient, and it is vital for international economic 
growth to achieve that goal. 
  CONCLUSION   
Trade preferences help developing countries industrialize 
quicker by providing easier access to foreign markets. The 
enacted programs, however, fall short of success. The flaws in 
the current programs range from inadequate product coverage 
to indifference toward burdensome initial costs. This Note sug-
 
 208. Id. at 133 (suggesting that policy concerns are not “exceptional cir-
cumstances”). But see id. at 143 (suggesting that the unavailability of other 
methods consistent with GATT principles may make something an “exception-
al circumstance”). 
 209. See Leal-Arcas, supra note 1, at 346; Ochieng, supra note 11, at 374. 
 210. See GALLAGHER, supra note 31, at 15 (noting that trade preferences 
have eroded over time); Bermann & Mavroidis, supra note 61, at 1 (explaining 
that LDCs have seen their portion of world trade decline over time); Ochieng, 
supra note 11, at 375–76 (discussing the fact that many LDCs are seeking 
more S&DT provisions in global trade agreements). 
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gests that trade preference programs should change their role 
so the employees act as representatives for the exporters. Not 
only should the employees actively seek out and encourage for-
eign exporters, but they should provide them with needed in-
formation and help them profit in the domestic marketplace. At 
the least, the changes can be limited to LDCs, or even a nar-
rower subset, so as to not violate the MFN rule. Overall, for 
these programs to fruitfully exist, the solution demands more 
resources. The need to produce results that assist developing 
countries should outweigh any expense concern. If developed 
countries enact the proposed solution, international trade will 
be closer to reaching an efficiency that benefits all nations 
through cheaper products, increased jobs, higher GDPs, and 
less economic disparity. 
